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The American immigration adjudication system has wit-nessed profound change in recent years. Starting in the 1980s, a series of legislative and administrative shifts has 
produced an immigration adjudication system that increasingly 
mirrors the criminal justice system. !is phenomenon, termed the 
“criminalization of immigration,”2 reflects a paradigm shift in the 
discourse on immigration law and policy. Historically focused on 
the exclusion and removal of the undocumented, immigration law 
and policy now increasingly prioritize removal of noncitizens with 
any criminal history. !ese developments have both revealed and 
exacerbated internal tensions in the Supreme Court’s treatment of 
immigration law, leading to a moment of unparalleled dissonance 
between the Supreme Court’s doctrine on immigration and the re-
ality of the American immigration enforcement and adjudication 
systems.3 
LEGISLATING THE CRIMINALIZATION OF IMMIGRATION
Legislative politics of immigration in the 1980s and 1990s 
reflected contradictory moral intuitions in American society about 
immigration. On one hand, American identity has historically 
been intertwined with the idea of a land of immigrants4 and the 
notion that all persons by virtue of their humanity deserve the op-
However heinous his crimes, deportation is to him exile, a dread-
ful punishment, abandoned by the common consent of all civilized 
peoples.  – Judge Learned Hand1
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portunity to seek a better life. On the other hand, deeply rooted 
and at times racially charged fears have often been expressed about 
the economic and security concerns associated with immigration. 
!e category of the criminal alien, referring to not only the un-
documented but also legal residents with any criminal history, has 
emerged as a mechanism for navigating the politics of immigration 
law. 
Starting in the mid 1980s, a flurry of legislation, animated by 
the idea of the criminal alien, increasingly connected the regulation 
of immigration with the regulation of crime. Despite the increasing 
overlap between criminal and immigration law, procedural protec-
tions in immigration law were continually weakened to look less 
and less like protections historically associated with the criminal 
justice system. Stephen Legomsky suggests that this process re-
flects a “selective, asymmetric … importation … of the criminal jus-
tice model into the domain of immigration law.”5 
In 1986, Congress passed the Immigration Reform and Con-
trol Act (IRCA), a piece of legislation emblematic of an emerg-
ing trend toward creating more opportunities for admission while 
emphasizing the removal of criminal aliens. IRCA introduced 
a new amnesty program for undocumented noncitizens living in 
the United States while dramatically increasing funding for border 
enforcement6 and criminalizing knowingly hiring undocumented 
workers.7 !roughout the 1980s, Congress also passed increas-
ingly punitive legislation governing drug policy and frequently 
built immigration consequences for criminal offenses into the leg-
islation. !e 1986 Anti-Drug Abuse Act, for example, tied drug 
offenses directly to bases of inadmissibility to the United States.8
!e criminalization of immigration continued with the 1990 
Immigration Act (IMMACT). Like IRCA, IMMACT expanded 
opportunities for immigration by raising the limit on admissions9 
but created harsher penalties for immigration violations and more 
severe immigration consequences for criminal violations. !e Vio-
lent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994 continued 
the trend by increasing the criminal penalty “for unlawful reentry 
after deportation that followed criminal convictions …. and for as-
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sisting noncitizens to enter unlawfully,” among other measures.10 
!e Act also increased federal resources allocated to immigration 
enforcement, particularly enforcement directed toward noncitizens 
with criminal records.11  
AEDPA AND IIRIRA
!ough harsher immigration enforcement policies and 
greater overlap between criminal and immigration law marked the 
decade following IRCA, the Antiterrorism and Effective Death 
Penalty Act (AEDPA) and the Illegal Immigration Reform and 
Immigration Responsibility Act (IIRIRA) changed immigration 
law more expansively and comprehensively than any other legisla-
tion in the previous decade.
 AEDPA expanded the grounds of deportability primarily 
by amending the definition of aggravated felony to include certain 
racketeering, gambling, forgery, bribery, perjury, and obstruction 
of justice offenses among others.  AEDPA dramatically changed 
the term’s place in immigration law.12 IIRIRA expanded the term’s 
definition even further.13 AEDPA and IIRIRA also broadened the 
reach of the term aggravated felony by defining it in terms of the 
length of the sentence imposed in a criminal proceeding as well as 
redefining the term conviction in immigration law. !rough this 
measure, common plea bargain practices such as imposing a sus-
pended sentence were retroactively redefined as convictions for 
immigration purposes. !ese convictions could then serve as the 
basis for an offense’s recategorization as an aggravated felony. Ju-
dicial discretion that had been exercised by providing a suspended 
sentence was effectively revoked. !ese changes allowed for crimes 
generally understood as minor crimes and treated as such in state 
law to be categorized as aggravated felonies in immigration law. 
AEDPA and IIRIRA also expanded the grounds of deport-
ability in other ways. AEDPA amended the INA to “[extend] de-
portation to aliens convicted of a crime of moral turpitude within 
five years of their date of entry, for which a sentence of one or more 
years is statutorily permitted.”14  IIRIRA created new federal im-
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migration crimes such as “knowingly making a false claim of U.S. 
citizenship …. and failing to cooperate in the execution of one’s re-
moval order.”15 !e retroactive application of these changes meant 
that many noncitizens who were legally present and had already 
served their sentences for minor crimes suddenly became deport-
able.16 Additionally, AEDPA and IIRIRA expanded the use of de-
tention in immigration proceedings. !e legislation attached man-
datory detention to a “wide range of crimes including simple drug 
possession”17 and expanded the use of detention primarily through 
redefinitions of aggravated felony since that category triggers man-
datory preventive detention. 
!e 1996 laws changed the avenues of relief available to non-
citizens in removal proceedings as well. Most significantly, Congress 
repealed Section 212(c) of the INA, a provision that had previous-
ly allowed immigration judges significant discretion in determining 
the fairness of deportation in a particular case.18 Section 212(c) 
had required immigration judges to “balance the adverse factors in-
dicating the alien’s undesirability as a permanent resident with the 
social and human considerations presented on his behalf.”19 !e 
1996 laws also changed the standard for relief for another com-
monly invoked provision, Section 244.20 Under Section 244, the 
INA had provided relief for noncitizens who could show ten years 
of continuous presence and good moral character, while proving 
that deportation “would result in extreme hardship to the alien or 
a U.S. citizen or permanent resident who is the alien’s spouse, par-
ent, or child.”21 !e 1996 legislation replaced the extreme hard-
ship clause with a more exacting requirement of “exceptional and 
extremely unusual hardship,”22 and also precluded any discretion-
ary relief for aggravated felonies.23  
Subsequent legislation continued this trend toward crimi-
nalization of immigration and greater restrictions on procedural 
protections. !e USA Patriot Act, passed on October 26, 2001, 
increased executive power of deportation and limited requirements 
of judicial review in cases “that the attorney general had ‘reason to 
believe’ [a noncitizen] might commit, further, or facilitate acts of 
terrorism.”24 !e REAL ID Act of 2005 further limited judicial 
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review of immigration cases25 by, among other measures, limiting 
the availability of habeas corpus claims to noncitizens, restrict-
ing those claims to courts of appeals, and not allowing them to be 
brought into federal district courts.26 In addition, the REAL ID 
Act “expanded the grounds of inadmissibility and deportability for 
terrorism-related charges, and introduced even more rigorous cri-
teria for asylum cases.”27
!e cumulative effect of this wave of legislation was a “revolu-
tion in the law of immigration.”28 Immigration and criminal law 
were increasingly intertwined as new criminal sanctions were at-
tached to immigration offenses and new immigration consequenc-
es were attached to criminal offenses. 
Against a backdrop of anti-crime, anti-drug rhetoric, Con-
gress relied on the morally loaded classification of the criminal alien 
to negotiate a deep tension between societal fears about increasing 
immigration and American identity as a nation of immigrants. !is 
category of criminal alien, however, cut across historical categories 
organizing the discourse on immigration policy according to legal 
status. Criminal alien at times referred to undocumented citizens 
and at times to legally present persons with criminal histories, and 
blurring this boundary often had consequences that legislators did 
not seem to have fully anticipated. In addition, noncitizens’ dis-
enfranchisement undermined efforts to voice concerns in the face 
of what was termed a “legislative steamroller,”29 attaching harsher 
penalties to immigration violations and restricting procedural pro-
tections in immigration proceedings.  
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Following the 1996 legislation, a series of shifts in adminis-
trative policy affecting both enforcement and adjudication practices 
furthered the trend of criminalization of immigration and restric-
tions on procedural protections. Immediately following the passage 
of the 1996 laws, the “number of INS law enforcement agents grew 
by 40 percent … [and] the increase in spending also, predictably, 
produced an increase in immigration related prosecutions.”30 How-
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ever, the largest shift in enforcement policy followed the Homeland 
Security Act of 2002, which restructured the government agencies 
relating to national security under the umbrella organization: the 
Department of Homeland Security (DHS).31 
!e Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) was ab-
sorbed by the Department of Homeland Security only six weeks 
after DHS’s creation, and INS’s functions were divided into three 
bureaus: the Citizenship and Immigration Services (CIS), Immi-
gration and Customs Enforcement (ICE), and Customs and Bor-
der Protection (CBP).32 !e DHS’s mission, stated in its strategic 
plan, reflected shifting priorities in enforcement: “We will lead the 
unified national effort to secure America. We will prevent and de-
ter terrorist attacks and protect against and respond to threats and 
hazards to the Nation. We will secure our national borders while 
welcoming lawful immigrants, visitors, and trade.” While the INS 
was a service with a clearly regulatory purpose, DHS focused on 
terrorist attacks and “respond[ing] to threats and hazards” while 
regulating immigration.33 Unprecedented sums were appropriated 
to these new agencies. In fiscal year 2008, ICE and CBP had an 
operating budget of over $15 billion,34 a massive increase in funds 
compared to the INS budget of just over $3.6 billion in 1998, par-
ticularly since the INS had been responsible for the functions of 
CIS in addition to ICE and CBP.35
Additionally, immigration officials have increasingly worked 
directly with police, as illustrated by INS beginning to enter civ-
il immigration information into the FBI’s criminal database in 
2001.36 !is collaboration has expanded with DHS’s increasing 
emphasis under the Obama administration on Secure Communi-
ties, a program that “mobilizes local law enforcement agencies’ re-
sources to enforce federal civil immigration law.”37 DHS has also 
enforced immigration regulations with increasing intensity, illus-
trated by their ambitious ten-year plan created in 2003 termed 
“Operation Endgame,” calling for removal of all removable nonciti-
zens by 2012,38 at the time an estimated twelve million people.39
As enforcement policy was changing, so was adjudication 
policy. Attorney General Ashcroft’s 2002 “reform” of the Board of 
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Immigration Appeals (BIA) dramatically changed the procedural 
protections afforded to noncitizens in immigration proceedings. 
"e BIA hears appeals of immigration judges’ decisions, and prior 
to the “reform” (also referred to as the “streamlining” of BIA pro-
cedures40), the Board would presumptively hear appeals in panels 
of three. "e reform provided for adjudication by a single Board 
member, unless the case fell into one of six categories41 or was 
specifically requested in writing by the appellee.42 "e reform also 
changed guidelines for Board members’ opinions, promoting and in 
many cases requiring summary affirmances in which a single Board 
member would affirm an immigration judge’s decision by using 
predetermined language defined by regulation instead of writing 
a case specific opinion.43 “"e Attorney General went so far as to 
authorize individual Board members to dispose of cases through 
the affirmance without opinion procedure even if there were errors 
in the immigration judge’s decision below, and even if the Board 
member did not agree with the reasoning of the decision below.”44 
 "ese trends in administrative policy have continued under 
the Obama administration. Janet Napolitano, President Obama’s 
Secretary of Homeland Security, has prioritized removal of legal 
residents deportable due to criminal charges. A DHS press release 
states, “Secretary Napolitano’s announcements … reflect this ad-
ministration’s continued focus on smart and effective immigration 
enforcement over the past twenty months – prioritizing the identi-
fication and removal of criminal aliens who pose a threat to public 
safety.” 
'VMQMREPM^IH-QQMKVEXMSR
 "e result of the legislation passed throughout the 1980s 
and 1990s and recent trends in administrative policy was, as Dan 
Kanstroom notes, a “paradoxical picture of a nation-state that has 
expanded both the number of people whom it admits and the num-
ber of people whom it expels.”45 As Bruce Western suggests, the 
politics of crime were connected in new ways to the politics of race 
and the economic concerns of the 1960s, 1970s, and 1980s.46 Un-
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derlying anxieties about race and economic insecurity that drove 
the anti-drug, anti-crime rhetoric of the 1980s at times drove anti-
immigrant sentiment as well. !ese overlapping concerns help ex-
plain the insertion of this rhetoric into the immigration debate, a 
process that resulted in a paradigmatic shift in the government’s 
approach to the regulation of immigration. Noncitizens in immi-
gration proceedings now experience an immigration adjudication 
system that functions dramatically differently than any other time 
in U.S. history. Reorganization of immigration law and policy 
around the removal of criminal aliens has affected every level of 
the immigration enforcement and adjudication systems. Rates of 
detention and deportation, as well as government spending on all 




Deportation rates have steadily increased since the 1980s, 
with 18,013 persons deported in 1980, 30,039 in 1990, 188,467 
in 2000, and 393,289 in 2009.47 Following the 1996 legislation the 
deportation rate increased more than 60 percent, jumping from 
69,680 deportations in 1996 to 114,432 in 1997.48 Crime related 
deportations have increased even more dramatically. Before 1986, 
crime-related deportations, “rarely, if ever, reached 2,000 per year.”49 
Following the passage of IRCA in 1986, however, the number of 
crime related deportations began to rise. !ere were 4,385 crime 
related deportations in 1987,50 42,014 in 1999,51 and 88,000 in 
2004.52  !is trend only accelerated during the 1990s with the 
passage of AEDPA and IIRIRA. From 1996 to 2003, there were 
1.2 million deportations, 517,861 of which were for criminal viola-
tions.53  
!is trend is still accelerating, as Napolitano reported a re-
cord 392,862 deportations in 2010, with about half of that num-
ber, 195,772, convicted criminals.54 Even these figures, however, 
fail to convey the full scale of this phenomenon, given that federal 
statistics count only orders of removal and not voluntary depar-
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tures. As Jennifer Chacon points out, currently “for every nonciti-
zen who receives a formal order of removal, another four depart 
‘voluntarily’ as a result of their encounters with the immigration 
enforcement bureaucracy.”55 DHS reports more that 1 million “re-
turns” as opposed to “removals” in eighteen of the twenty-four years 
for which statistics have been reported.56
IMMIGRATION DETENTION
Rates of detention have increased along with increased efforts 
at enforcement and increased eligibility for mandatory detention. 
Between 1995 and 2007, the average daily population of U.S. im-
migration detainees increased from about six thousand to more 
than 27,000,57 and in 2008 and 2009 an average of 33,000 individ-
uals were detained on any given night.58 From 1994 to 2008, the 
overall number of yearly detentions rose from roughly 81,000 to 
380,000,59 and estimates place the number of detentions for 2009 
between 380,000 and 442,000 at an annual cost of $1.7 billion.60
"e government detains noncitizens in Service Processing 
Centers, Contract Detention Facilities, Intergovernmental Service 
Agreement Facilities, and in U.S. Bureau of Prisons.61 Intergov-
ernmental Service Agreement Facilities, generally state or county 
jails with beds designated for immigration detainees, house the vast 
majority—almost 67 percent—of detainees.62 Conditions in im-
migration detention facilities largely mirror conditions of prisons 
or jails. Detainees are treated similarly to those convicted of crimes 
and have reported being “constrained with handcuffs, belly chains, 
and leg restraints.”63 Additionally, the immigration detention sys-
tem is “woefully unregulated”64 and lacks legal binding standards, 
“sending a clear message that noncompliance [with standards] car-
ries no real penalty.”65 As rates of detention have increased dramat-
ically without a corresponding development of capacity and stan-
dards for detention, an overburdened detention system has been 
widely criticized for alleged violations of human rights and failures 
to adequately respond to claims of abuse.66
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COSTS IN TERMS OF FAIRNESS 
Concerns about whether the immigration adjudication sys-
tem is meeting basic standards of fairness have increasingly been 
voiced from within the legal community.67 For example, Judge 
Richard Posner has argued, “the adjudication of these cases at the 
administrative level has fallen below the minimum standards of le-
gal justice,”68 and in various opinions has suggested immigration 
courts’ decisions are “arbitrary, unreasoned, irrational, inconsistent, 
and uninformed.”69
!e BIA has also been widely criticized for its failure to meet 
basic standards of justice. !e Seventh Circuit alleged that the BIA 
was “not aware of the most basic facts.”70  Additionally, “Board deci-
sions in favor of noncitizens fell from 25 percent to 10 percent”71 
immediately following the “streamlining,” raising questions about 
whether the streamlining had changed the decision-making pro-
cess in a way that compromised the fundamental fairness of the 
proceeding. 
!e costs in terms of fairness associated with the dramatic 
changes in immigration law and policy are more difficult to mea-
sure than absolute numbers of deportations or rates of detention. 
Fairness is an elusive concept. While some hold that fairness re-
quires individualized review, others assert that fairness requires 
treating like cases in a similar fashion. !ese two components can 
often pull in different directions, one toward allowing greater judi-
cial discretion and the other toward more standardization through 
more specific rules.  
However, even as immigration adjudication procedures have 
moved steadily away from individualized review by increasing the 
number of cases subject to expedited removal, restricting oppor-
tunities for judicial review, and “streamlining” adjudication proce-
dures, studies of immigration court outcomes show wide dispari-
ties in grant rates depending on factors that few believe should 
determine outcomes. For example, a thorough study of disparities 
in asylum adjudication conducted by Jaya Ramji-Nogales, Andrew 
Shoenholtz, and Philip Schrag determined that (1) whether asy-
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lum seekers were represented by legal counsel (2) the asylum seek-
er’s number of dependants, (3) the gender of the judge, and (4) the 
prior work experience of the judge each had a statistically signifi-
cant relationship to asylum grant rates, at a 99 percent confidence 
level.72 Certainly, asylum cases are not representative of all immi-
gration cases, but the dramatic disparities emphasize the costs in 
terms of fairness associated with recent policy changes, as more and 
more noncitizens experience an immigration adjudication system 
that defies expectations for consistency as a component of fairness. 
Cumulatively, these changes reflect a fundamental shift in 
American immigration law and policy. !e criminalization of im-
migration has created new tensions within constitutional immigra-
tion law that still relies on a nineteenth century picture of immi-
gration law and policy and is increasingly disconnected from the 
current reality of the American immigration system. 
 “A CONSTITUTIONAL ODDITY”: THE LEGAL HISTORY 
OF THE SUPREME COURT’S TREATMENT OF IMMIGRA-
TION
Constitutional law governing immigration adjudication is an 
area of law in which, as Anna Law has noted, “it appears, the nor-
mal rules do not apply.”73 !e Supreme Court is generally called 
upon to provide meaningful substantive protection of constitution-
al rights and to justify these protections against critiques that say 
these protections are counter-majoritarian and anti-democratic. As 
Ronald Dworkin has explained, “!e right method [constitutional 
scholars] say, is something in between which strikes the right bal-
ance between protecting essential individual rights and deferring to 
popular will.  But they do not indicate what the right balance is, or 
even what kind of scale we should use to find it.”74 
 !ese challenging questions about the proper scope of ju-
dicial review, the proper interpretive methods, and the proper in-
terpretations, however, have been largely absent from the develop-
ment of constitutional immigration law. !e Court has justified 
its silence on these questions with reference to the “plenary power” 
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doctrine75 that “confer[s] upon Congress and the Executive Branch 
the power to regulate immigration without judicial restraint.”76 
!e Supreme Court’s consistent deference in immigration cases 
sets immigration law apart from any other area of public law in 
which different justices have historically approached constitutional 
interpretation in dramatically different ways despite the existence 
of clearer textual bases for interpretation.77 
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Early Supreme Court opinions provided the foundation for 
the plenary power doctrine at the heart of the Court’s deferential 
approach to judicial review of immigration cases. In these cases, the 
Court relied heavily on extralegal judgments about immigration, an 
approach that likely resulted from the lack of a significant body of 
federal immigration law at the time.78 Justice Field writes in Chae 
Chan Ping v. United States (1889) that “the powers to declare war, 
make treaties, suppress insurrections … are all sovereign powers, 
restricted in their exercise only by the Constitution itself,” sug-
gesting that though the Constitution may constrain government 
action, the Court is not empowered to interpret the nature of that 
constraint.79 
Chae Chan Ping’s case arose from his detention at the border, 
even though he had been a legal resident of the United States, and 
was framed in terms of exclusion. Justice Field wrote: 
If … the government of the United States, through its legisla-
tive department, considers the presence of foreigners of a dif-
ferent race in this country, who will not assimilate with us, to 
be dangerous to its peace and security, their exclusion is not to 
be stayed because at the time there are no actual hostilities with 
the nation of which the foreigners are subjects. !e existence 
of war would render the necessity of the proceeding only more 
obvious and pressing. !e same necessity, in a less pressing de-
gree, may arise when war does not exist, and the same authority 
which adjudges the necessity in one case must also determine it 
in the other. In both cases its determination is conclusive upon 
the judiciary.80
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!is comparison between the judicial review of immigration ad-
judication and the judicial review of congressional powers in war 
helps contextualize Justice Field’s judgment about the scope of in-
terpretive authority.  However, Justice Field does not explain why 
these types of cases merit different interpretive authority or why 
the facts of Chae Chan Ping (1889) make the case analogous to na-
tional sovereignty matters in the salient respect that merits exemp-
tion from judicial review. Chae Chan Ping’s exclusion was based 
on nationality, and beyond his identity as a Chinese national, the 
government made no indication that it considered his presence a 
threat to national sovereignty. !e Court’s inchoate explanation 
of the relationship between national sovereignty, national security, 
and interpretive authority would typify future holdings in immi-
gration cases. 
In the case Nishimura Ekiu v. United States (1892), the Court 
reformulated the rationale for its holdings on interpretive authority 
in immigration matters.  In Ekiu, the Court suggests that sover-
eignty and self-preservation justify judicial interpretive deference. 
Ekiu arrived by steamship to meet her husband with $22 in cash. 
She told the immigration inspector that though she did not have 
her husband’s phone number, they had planned for him to call her 
at a prearranged hotel.81 Still, the inspector excluded her on the 
grounds that she was likely to become a public charge. She applied 
for habeas corpus, providing evidence to refute the accusation, but 
that evidence was excluded by the circuit court due to its finding 
that the administrative decision regarding her likelihood of becom-
ing a public charge “was conclusive upon the judiciary.”82
Addressing the question of whether or not the statute vio-
lated due process by making the administrative findings of fact 
conclusive upon the judiciary, Justice Gray wrote, “As to [foreign-
ers who have never been naturalized, nor acquired any domicile or 
residence within the United States, nor even been admitted into 
the country pursuant to law], the decisions of executive … officers, 
acting within powers expressly conferred by Congress, are due pro-
cess of law.”83 By claiming that the executive’s decision is due pro-
cess, Justice Gray suggests that due process is required but judicial 
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review may not be necessary to ensure due process. Justice Gray’s 
rhetorical focus on national security and foreign relations through-
out the opinion again helps contextualize this interpretation of due 
process that leaves ambiguous whether the Court is asserting a lack 
of interpretive authority or a requirement for interpretive defer-
ence. 
In Chae Chan Ping and Ekiu, the Court held that federal 
power to exclude merited deference comparable to that afforded to 
wartime actions and that due process afforded noncitizens in exclu-
sion proceedings necessarily met constitutional requirements. Fong 
Yue Ting v. United States (1893) extended those holdings to include 
expulsion (deportation) as well. In Fong Yue Ting, three Chinese 
laborers were arrested for not possessing required certificates of 
residence proving that they had been living in the United States 
when the Act of May 5, 1892, was passed.  "at Act stipulated that 
a laborer would be deportable without a certificate of residence or 
proof that he had been unable to secure the certificate and testi-
mony about his residence by “at least one credible white witness.”84
Evaluating the three laborers’ challenge to the constitution-
ality of the white witness requirement, Justice Gray wrote, “"e 
power to exclude aliens and the power to expel them rest upon one 
foundation, are derived from one source, are supported by the same 
reasons, and are in truth but parts of one and the same power.”85 
Justice Gray cited the “power … inherent in sovereignty” asserted 
in Ekiu and the “independence” and “relation to foreign countries” 
asserted in Chae Chan Ping as the relevant reasons, suggesting that 
these reasons for restricting judicial review in cases involving ex-
clusion were also reasons for judicial deference in cases involving 
deportation.86 Justice Gray continued, “"e order of deportation is 
not a punishment for crime. It is not a banishment, in the sense in 
which that word is often applied to the expulsion of a citizen from 
his country by way of punishment.”87  
Justice Gray’s emphasis that deportation is not punishment 
illustrates the tension created by his argument for judicial defer-
ence. "ough he argues for extreme judicial deference and possibly 
that the government should have final interpretive authority in this 
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case, he nonetheless attempts to provide a constitutional interpre-
tation justifying the government’s action—in this case basing that 
interpretation of the requirements of due process on the argument 
that deportation is not punishment. !is holding still powerfully 
shapes constitutional jurisprudence on immigration today.
Taken together, these opinions “can be viewed as the three ba-
sic building blocks of the 'plenary' congressional power over immi-
gration. !e Chinese Exclusion Case recognized an inherent federal 
power to exclude noncitizens; Ekiu appeared to reject due process 
limits on the exercise of that power, and Fong Yue Ting extended 
the principle of both cases from exclusion to deportation.”88  Addi-
tionally, in Chae Chan Ping, the Court connected judgments about 
immigration to an argument about interpretive authority, in Ekiu 
that argument was for judicial interpretive deference, and in Fong 
Yue Ting the reasons given for restricting judicial authority or for 
interpretive deference were applied in a case involving deportation 
rather than exclusion. In these cases, the Court relies on a charac-
terization of immigration as raising the same concerns as sover-
eignty or foreign relations, rather than on statutory interpretation, 
to justify its deference. !e opinions, however, never fully articulate 
why these concerns should exempt these cases from judicial review 
or change the Court’s interpretive method. Similarly, the Court 
never fully articulates why immigration proceedings should not be 
categorized as punishment. Still, these judgments about the nature 
of immigration and immigration law have remained remarkably 
durable features of the Court’s jurisprudence on immigration, even 
as trends in immigration law and policy have undermined their 
plausibility, particularly the plausibility of the assertion that depor-
tation is not punishment. 
(YI4VSGIWW4VSXIGXMSRWMR)EVP]-QQMKVEXMSR0E[
!ough Fong Yue Ting v. United States (1893) provided a cor-
nerstone for the plenary power doctrine that justified “extraordi-
nary judicial deference,”89 the three dissents in that case also laid 
the foundation for the subsequently accepted proposition that non-
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citizens should be afforded due process rights. In Justice Brewer’s 
dissent, he emphasized that “whatever rights a resident alien might 
have in any other nation, here he is within the express protection 
of the Constitution.”90 He further emphasizes that “deportation is 
punishment,” and that “no person who has once come within the 
protection of the Constitution can be punished without a trial.”91 
Additionally, Justice Field, the author of Chae Chan Ping and Ekiu, 
wrote:
"e moment any human being from a country at peace with us 
comes within the jurisdiction of the United States, with their 
consent – and such consent will always be implied when not ex-
pressly withheld … he becomes subject to all their laws, is ame-
nable to their punishment and entitled to their protection.92
All three dissents argued for the importance of affording consti-
tutional protections to noncitizen residents in the United States, 
implicitly challenging the majority’s ruling that these constitutional 
protections could be sufficiently guaranteed without judicial review 
by the fact of their dissent. Justice Brewer described the argument 
for constitutional protections for noncitizens, particularly due pro-
cess protections, most clearly when he wrote: 
"e Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution is not confined 
to the protection of citizens. It says: ‘Nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property without due process of 
law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal pro-
tection of the laws. "ese provisions are universal in their appli-
cation to all persons within the territorial jurisdiction, without 
regard to any differences of race, of color, or of nationality; and 
the equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of 
equal laws … If the use of the word “person” in the Fourteenth 
Amendment protects all individuals lawfully within the State, 
the use of the same word “person” in the Fifth must be equally 
comprehensive, and secures to all persons lawfully within the 
territory of the United States the protection named therein.93
"ese Justices’ dissents suggest that their willingness to assert judi-
cially reviewable constitutional rights of Chinese immigrants was 
based on an understanding of the centrality of protecting due pro-
cess to maintaining meaningful protection of rights under law, as 
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well as concern with unchecked government power and the impli-
cations of such extreme judicial deference in terms of rule of law. 
Yamataya v. Fisher (1903)
!e due process protections for noncitizens asserted in these 
dissents were later affirmed in Yamataya v. Fisher (1903), though 
the scope of these protections was still strongly influenced by the 
views articulated in Chae Chan Ping, Ekiu, and Fong Yue Ting. In 
Yamataya v. Fisher, Justice Harlan wrote, “this court has never held, 
nor must we now be understood as holding, that administrative 
officers, when executing the provisions of a statute involving the 
liberty of persons, may disregard the fundamental principles that 
inhere in ‘due process of law’ as understood at the time of the adop-
tion of the Constitution.”94  Harlan continued, however, that the 
due process protection required, “not necessarily an opportunity 
upon a regular, set occasion, and according to the forms of judicial 
procedure, but one that will … be appropriate to the nature of the 
case.”95 Harlan even specified that due process did not require that 
appellant understand the procedure.96 
Harlan’s ruling would foreshadow the Court’s treatment of 
noncitizens’ due process protections in immigration proceedings. 
!e Court has shown strong and consistent support for the noncit-
izen due process protections in cases such as Wong Wing v. United 
States (1896), which guaranteed that noncitizens may not be sub-
ject to criminal punishment without due process protections,97 
and Zadvydas v. Davis (2001),98 which asserts that indefinite de-
tention of irremovable admitted aliens violates due process require-
ments.  However, like Harlan’s opinion in Yamataya v. Fisher, de-
spite asserting due process protections, the Court has defined the 
requirements of due process so narrowly that it raises the question 
of whether the Court’s interpretive deference crossed a line into a 
functional abdication of interpretive authority. !is interpretation 
highlights the indeterminacy inherent in due process and suggests 
how this indeterminacy allows for interpretations of due process 
that can betray the spirit of rights protection. 
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!e indeterminacy of the phrase combined with the Court’s 
extreme interpretive deference have allowed for a tension to devel-
op between the Court’s deferential treatment of due process claims 
and an immigration law that increasingly merits stronger proce-
dural protections according to standards the Court has developed 
in other areas of law. !e Supreme Court has explained the inad-
equacies of these protections by pointing out both that noncitizens 
may be treated differently from citizens and that immigration pro-
ceedings present a unique set of concerns that merit different pro-
cedural protections than would, for example, a criminal proceeding.
In Demore v. Kim (2003), the Court decided whether allow-
ing mandatory preventive detention for a wide range of noncitizens 
in immigration proceedings violated due process. Justice Rehnquist 
wrote for the majority, upholding the constitutionality of the de-
tention and noting, “this Court has firmly and repeatedly endorsed 
the proposition that Congress may make rules as to aliens that 
would be unacceptable if applied to citizens.”99 !ough the Court 
suggested in Demore v. Kim that different protections should be 
afforded based on the identity of the person claiming due process 
protection, the Court has more often justified its narrow interpre-
tation of the procedural protections owed noncitizens with argu-
ments about why different protections are due.
!e holding in Ekiu that any procedure dictated by the gov-
ernment would necessarily constitute due process seems to have 
formed the baseline for the Court’s evaluation of the procedural 
protections “due” to noncitizens in immigration proceedings. In 
Zadvydas v. Davis, Justice Clark noted, “the Constitution may well 
preclude granting an administrative body the unreviewable author-
ity to make determinations implicating fundamental rights.”100 
But against what standard the courts may review that authority 
has been left largely undefined, despite the admittedly fundamental 
rights of personal freedom at stake. 
In determining the requirements of due process in immigra-
tion proceedings, the Court has repeatedly deferred to the legis-
lature. !e Court demonstrated this deference when addressing 
the question of whether deportation proceedings must meet the 
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requirements of the Administrative Procedure Act in order to 
meet the required constitutional standard.  In 1950, Justice Jackson 
wrote in Wong Yang Sung v. McGrath: 
!e Administrative Procedure Act … does cover deportation 
proceedings conducted by the Immigration Service … [since]  it 
might be difficult to justify as measuring up to constitutional 
standards of impartiality a hearing tribunal for deportation pro-
ceedings the like of which has been condemned by Congress 
[in the APA] as unfair even where less vital matters of property 
rights are at stake.101 
Justice Jackson also pointed to the particular importance of pro-
cedural protections in cases of “voteless…litigants … [lacking] the 
influence of citizens … strangers to the laws and customs in which 
they find themselves…and who often do not even understand the 
tongue in which they are accused.”102 !e Court held that the APA 
should apply. 
However, in 1951, Congress included a provision in the Sup-
plemental Appropriation Act that the relevant sections of the APA 
should not govern deportation proceedings.103 When asked to de-
termine whether Congress had implicitly reinstated the APA re-
quirement with the passage of the INA in 1952, the Court held in 
Marcello v. Bonds (1955) that “the [INA] expressly supersedes the 
hearing provisions of that Act.”104 !e Court dismissed the con-
tention that the procedural protections provided would not meet 
the requirements of due process, writing “[this] contention is with-
out substance when considered against the long-standing practice 
in deportation proceedings, judicially approved in numerous deci-
sions in the federal court, and against the special considerations 
applicable to deportation which Congress may take into account 
in exercising its particularly broad discretion in immigration mat-
ters.”105 Kanstroom suggests that “the Court, at the height of the 
Cold War, had simply lost the strong ‘rule of law’ spirit that had 
been engendered by the 1946 APA … [and] relegated [immigra-
tion law] to extra-constitutional status.”106 Now, although depor-
tation hearings now conform to many APA requirements, compli-
ance is not constitutionally required.107 
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More recently, the Court has indicated some willingness to 
assert interpretive authority over immigration cases, pointing out 
that immigration provisions are subject to constitutional limits. 
However, the few cases in which the Court has ruled in favor of 
noncitizen appellants have been primarily cases involving statutory 
interpretation rather than protections of constitutional rights.  In INS v. St Cyr (2001), the Supreme Court held that 
noncitizens who would have been eligible to seek 212(c) relief had 
they not taken plea agreements, following the passage of IIRIRA 
in 1996, could still apply.  However, Justice Stevens, writing for 
the majority, did not specifically invoke noncitizens’ due process 
protections. Rather than focusing on the constitutional guarantee 
against ex post facto criminal penalties, the Court emphasized case 
law providing for a “presumption against retroactivity”108 and a 
consideration of legislative intent. Justice Stevens points out, “We 
find nothing in IIRIRA unmistakably indicating that Congress 
considered the question whether to apply its repeal of § 212(c) ret-
roactively to such aliens.”109 
Similarly, the Court held in Carachuri-Rosendo v. Holder 
(2010) that a noncitizen convicted twice in state court for non-fel-
ony simple possession should not be categorized as an aggravated 
felon and be precluded from seeking discretionary relief. 110 Justice 
Stevens wrote for the majority: 
As the text and structure of the relevant statutory provisions 
demonstrate, the defendant must also have been actually con-
victed of a crime that is itself punishable as a felony under fed-
eral law. !e mere possibility that the defendant’s conduct, cou-
pled with facts outside of the record of conviction, could have 
authorized a felony conviction under federal law is insufficient 
to satisfy the statutory command that a noncitizen be ‘convicted 
of a[n] aggravated felony’ before he loses the opportunity to seek 
cancellation of removal.111  
Again, rather than relying on interpretation of constitutional re-
quirements, Justice Stevens reasons from “the text and structure of 
the relevant statutory provisions.”112 
In Zadvydas v. Davis (2001), the Court seemed more willing 
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to recognize noncitizens’ constitutional rights. In an opinion stat-
ing that the government may not indefinitely detain admitted non-
citizens subject to removal, Justice Breyer emphasized, “the ‘plenary 
power’ [doctrine]…is subject to important constitutional limita-
tions.”113 Despite suggesting its responsibility to uphold nonciti-
zens’ constitutional protections, however, the Court also empha-
sized that “if Congress has made its intent in the statute clear, ‘we 
must give effect to that intent.’”114 As these opinions illustrate, 
Supreme Court decisions relating to immigration seem to assert 
the applicability of the Constitution and at times even assert the 
Court’s authority to interpret constitutional requirements.  How-
ever, when those rights may conflict with Congressional intent, the 
Court has functionally failed to protect noncitizens’ constitutional 
rights, often not even acknowledging constitutional issues at stake. 
Padilla v. Kentucky (2010)
In a departure from this long trend of refusal to consider the 
precepts underlying the plenary power doctrine, the Court gave 
some indication in Padilla v. Kentucky (2010) that it may reconsid-
er the designation of immigration law as civil rather than criminal, 
an assumption that has persisted since Fong Yue Ting.  In Padilla, 
the Court considered whether Padilla’s attorney’s mistaken advice 
that taking a plea in a criminal proceeding would not have immi-
gration consequences constituted a violation of the Sixth Amend-
ment’s guarantee of effective assistance of counsel.
 "e Court’s decision hinged upon its determination of 
whether deportation was, “merely a ‘collateral’ consequence of his 
conviction.”115 "is distinction is meaningful because courts have 
generally found defendants entitled to constitutional protections of 
criminal proceedings when a consequence of a conviction is puni-
tive rather than remedial and direct rather than collateral.116  "e 
Court ultimately ruled that, “constitutionally competent counsel 
would have advised [Padilla] that his conviction for drug distribu-
tion made him subject to automatic deportation.”117  
Justice Stevens wrote, “deportation as a consequence of a 
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criminal conviction is, because of its close connection to the crimi-
nal process, uniquely difficult to classify as either a direct or a col-
lateral consequence.”118 As Peter Markowitz explained, “we can 
understand the Court’s inability to classify deportation as direct 
or collateral as a proxy for, or at a minimum strongly suggesting, 
a similar conclusion that deportation is neither purely civil, nor 
purely criminal.”119 
"e opinion also contained strong language that suggested a 
willingness to reconsider the civil designation of deportation pro-
ceedings. Justice Stevens’ opinion chronicled the progressive over-
lap between criminal and immigration law as well as the increas-
ingly automatic immigration consequences of criminal convictions. 
He wrote: "e landscape of federal immigration law has changed dramati-
cally over the last 90 years. While once there was only a narrow 
class of deportable offenses and judges wielded broad discretion-
ary authority to prevent deportation, immigration reforms over 
time have expanded the class of deportable offenses and limited 
the authority of judges to alleviate the harsh consequences of 
deportation … Although removal proceedings are civil in nature 
… deportation is nevertheless intimately related to the criminal 
process … Importantly, recent changes in our immigration law 
have made removal nearly an automatic result for a broad class of 
noncitizen offenders. "us we find it “most difficult” to divorce 
the penalty from the conviction in the deportation context.120
"ough the Court’s ruling in Padilla does not directly affect the 
due process protections afforded noncitizens, it suggests a willing-
ness to reconsider some of the assumptions that have persisted in 
constitutional immigration law since the early immigration cases, 
a willingness that is a significant departure from a long history of 
extreme deference in constitutional immigration law. 
DEVELOPMENT OF THE CONSTITUTIONAL DOCTRINE 
ON IMMIGRATION
Constitutional law governing the immigration adjudication 
system reflects “two different ideological threads: the one deny-
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ing that a society owes aliens any obligation to which it does not 
consent, the other affirming the existence of certain obligations to 
aliens owed simply by reason of their humanity.”121 Since Yama-
taya, the Court has consistently and strongly asserted that nonciti-
zens may claim protection under the Due Process Clause by virtue 
of their personhood. However, the Court has consistently deferred 
to Congress in interpreting the scope of noncitizens’ constitutional 
protections in immigration proceedings, often citing different ob-
ligations to noncitizens. Under this doctrine, a tension has devel-
oped between the Court’s assertion of constitutional protections 
and its unwillingness to interpret those constitutional protections 
in any way that may conflict with Congressional intent in regulat-
ing immigration. #e result is an approach to interpretation of im-
migration law best understood as “a constitutional oddity.”122 
Changes in immigration law and policy since the 1980s have 
brought to light the implications of such a doctrine, as the assertion 
that “deportation is not punishment” has become an increasingly 
unreasonable justification for the Court’s refusal to meaningfully 
protect noncitizens’ due process claims in immigration proceed-
ings.  #e Court may argue that since deportation is not punish-
ment, noncitizens’ due process protections are sufficiently protect-
ed even despite the Court’s deference. However, the discrepancy 
between the Court’s interpretation of due process in immigration 
proceedings and in other cases where increasingly similar interests 
are at stake undermines this assertion. 
As trends toward the criminalization of immigration con-
tinue to intensify, the implications of the Supreme Court’s unique 
deference in constitutional immigration law are increasingly ex-
posed.  Most notably, should the Supreme Court acknowledge—as 
Stevens’ opinion in Padilla indicated some willingness to do—that 
deportation is punishment, the Court would be forced to explain 
allowing for drastically different procedural protections in admit-
tedly similar circumstances. 
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EVALUATING ARGUMENTS FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES
!e proper role of courts in a democratic society has long 
been the subject of a philosophical debate that reflects deeply en-
trenched views about what constitutional democracy means. !is 
paper does not attempt to argue for a particular role that courts 
should play in society or for a particular approach that the Supreme 
Court should adopt in interpreting the Constitution. Rather, this 
paper seeks to establish that the fact that a case relates to immigra-
tion should neither weaken the argument for judicial review nor 
fundamentally change the Court’s approach to Constitutional in-
terpretation. 
!e Court’s arguments for deference in cases related to im-
migration have relied heavily on certain precepts about immigra-
tion law and policy that have remained largely unexamined since 
their introduction in the nineteenth century. First, constitutional 
law relating to immigration relies on an argument for deference 
that at times conflates arguments about interpretive authority with 
arguments about the correct interpretive approach.  !at argument 
characterizes immigration as meriting deference because of its re-
lationship to national sovereignty and foreign relations.  Second, 
constitutional law contends that deportation is not punishment. 
Recent changes in immigration law and policy, however, have un-
dermined the plausibility of these precepts. 
PLENARY POWER AND THE ARGUMENT AGAINST JUDI-
CIAL REVIEW 
Early Supreme Court cases framed immigration in terms of 
national sovereignty and foreign relations to justify the restriction 
of judicial review.123 Arguments that the Supreme Court should 
not have interpretive authority over immigration matters have been 
widely criticized and implicitly rejected by the Court itself, as it 
has resolved constitutional questions of immigration matters.124 
Nonetheless, the reasons initially given for restricting judicial re-
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view merit evaluation because they are still invoked to explain judi-
cial deference in constitutional immigration law. 
!e two central arguments for restricting judicial review are 
immigration law’s connection to foreign relations and to national 
sovereignty.125 !ough the Court has not clearly articulated what 
about these cases merits special deference, one account of the for-
eign relations argument suggests that the Court owes special defer-
ence in immigration cases because immigration decisions “operat[e] 
on the subject of a foreign state,”126 and the Court should not in-
terfere with government relations with that state through a deci-
sion about the immigration status of that state’s subject.127 
Even taking as a premise the unexplained claim that all cases 
relating to foreign relations merit special judicial deference, this 
argument identifies cases that should be shielded from judicial re-
view at once too broadly and too narrowly. Not all cases relating to 
immigration affect foreign relations.  Although the United States’ 
treatment of refugees arriving at its border may have foreign rela-
tions implications, a long-term resident alien deported following a 
criminal conviction for an offense committed within the territorial 
United States would not likely raise foreign relations concerns. Ad-
ditionally, many cases that are subject to judicial review, such as for-
eign nationals’ criminal cases, do have clear foreign relations impli-
cations. Similarly, the Constitution provides for judicial review of 
“cases arising under treaties, disputes between an American state or 
its citizens, and even cases affecting ambassadors,”128 all instances 
in which foreign relations concerns do arise. 
In Hamdi v. Rumsfeld (2004), the Court upheld the due pro-
cess claims of an American citizen captured in Afghanistan and la-
beled an enemy combatant. Justice O’Connor wrote, “due process 
demands that a citizen held in the United States as an enemy com-
batant be given a meaningful opportunity to contest the factual basis 
for that detention before a neutral decisionmaker.”129 In this case, 
the government claimed that the authority to detain Hamdi under 
the Authorization for Use of Military Force, which “empower[ed] 
the President to “use all necessary and appropriate force” against 
“nations, organizations, or persons” that he determined “planned, 
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authorized, committed, or aided” in the September 11, 2001 al Qa-
eda terrorist attacks.”130 Foreign relations were directly implicated 
in the case, yet the Court did not seem to approach this case with 
special deference. 
!ough this contradiction suggests that a foreign relations 
concern may not be the complete justification for restricting judi-
cial review, one possible response could be that erring on the side of 
non-interference with foreign relation cases is preferable to erring 
on the side of preserving judicial review despite possible foreign 
relations concerns. However, the Court need not categorize all im-
migration cases in the same way. !e Court could, as Legomsky 
suggests, balance foreign relations concerns in a particular case 
against individual rights at issue.131  !is overbroad categorization 
of immigration cases as relating to foreign relations is also an in-
creasingly less accurate picture of immigration proceedings as the 
number of crime-related immigration cases has risen dramatically 
over the past twenty years.
!e other argument for restricting judicial review is national 
sovereignty.132 Sovereignty, so the argument goes, “entail[s] the 
unlimited power of the nation … to decide whether, under what 
conditions, and with what effects it would consent to enter into 
a relationship with a stranger.”133 However, as Gerald Neuman 
points out:
One can readily agree that the sovereignty and independence 
of the United States would be impaired if other nations could 
unilaterally force it to accept or retain their citizens without its 
consent. But … in the postwar era, international human rights 
norms may impose limits on a nation’s discretion to expel or ex-
clude aliens. Sovereignty is a more relativized concept today and 
absolute control over the movement of persons in its territory is 
no longer regarded as a necessary ingredient of sovereignty.134 
Sovereignty is an even less compelling explanation for judicial def-
erence in cases of removal on the grounds of post-entry conduct. In 
these cases, the nation has already entered into a relationship with 
and assumed certain obligations to a noncitizen. Moreover, even ac-
cepting the unlikely proposition that all immigration cases directly 
175Journal of Politics & Society
imply a threat to national sovereignty does not explain why that 
relationship to sovereignty should preclude judicial review. Judicial 
review suggests a requirement of adherence to the Constitution 
and does not necessarily preclude national ability to shape deci-
sions about membership.
 Furthermore, as Legomsky points out, the national sover-
eignty argument, like the foreign relations argument, bases a claim 
about the proper scope of judicial review on “the existence of an in-
herent, nonenumerated Congressional power [from which] the ple-
nary power doctrine follows”.135  !e Court’s willingness to accept 
a nonenumerated Congressional power as the basis for restricting 
judicial review contradicts the Court’s strong presumption for ju-
dicial review, a presumption illustrated by its willingness to review 
even cases in which Congress has a clear enumerated power.136
 !ese two arguments against judicial review center on the 
dependence of self-determination and national autonomy on a gov-
ernment’s ability to make decisions and take action. However, the 
arguments largely fail to discuss how judicial review or a particular 
interpretive approach would undermine the government’s capacity 
for self-determination. After all, the Supreme Court is an integral 
part of American government. !ese arguments seem to suggest an 
unarticulated argument for a different balance of power between 
branches of government when certain interests are at stake.
Although constitutional authority for judicial review is at 
times contested, the authority of the Supreme Court to interpret 
the requirements of the Constitution has emerged as a definitional 
feature of American federalism. If immigration merits a departure 
from this system, the precise boundaries and nature of the reasons 
for this departure should be clearly articulated.  Failing to articulate 
these reasons seems to disregard the historical and philosophical 
reasons for affording the Supreme Court judicial review. 
ADDITIONAL ARGUMENT FOR JUDICIAL DEFERENCE 
In constitutional immigration law, previously discussed ar-
guments for deference tend to invoke the explanations relating to 
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national sovereignty or foreign relations that were originally used 
as arguments for restricting interpretive authority. Since immigra-
tion is a subset of administrative law, arguments for deference have 
also been drawn from general arguments for deference invoked in 
administrative law. 
When agency decisions that do not clearly implicate con-
stitutional requirements are at issue, the Chevron doctrine coun-
sels deference to “reasonable agency interpretations of ambiguous 
statutory provisions, even if the court disagrees with those inter-
pretations.”137 Since the Executive Office for Immigration Review 
(EOIR) is an administrative agency under the authority of the 
Department of Justice, Chevron has been invoked to call for Court 
deference to agency decisions regarding immigration law. 
Chevron’s importance in administrative law derives not only 
from the Court’s ruling for a fairly strong presumption of defer-
ence toward agency interpretations but also from “Justice Stevens’ 
broad articulation of the reasons judges should defer.”138 William 
Eskridge explains:
Most originally [Stevens claimed that] agencies are relatively 
more legitimate policy-balancers than courts, because the execu-
tive branch is more ‘directly accountable to the people.’  "us, 
when Congress (the most accountable branch) has not directly 
addressed the issue, and the agency has filled the statutory gap in 
a reasonable way, “federal judges—who have no constituency—
have a duty to respect legitimate policy choices made by those 
who do.139 
Deference under the Chevron doctrine is also “often defended on 
the ground that administrative agencies have greater expertise … 
than courts.”140 Even these arguments for deference to agency in-
terpretations are extremely weak in the context of immigration 
court, particularly given recent changes in immigration law and 
policy.  
"e structure of immigration courts and the selection pro-
cess of immigration judges do not suggest that immigration courts 
would have greater expertise that should merit deference.  Immigra-
tion judges were “special inquiry officers” with the INS until their 
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adjudicatory function was transferred to the EOIR in 1983.141 
!ey are not members of the judicial branch,142 nor are they 
strictly considered administrative law judges, as administrative law 
judges are required to pass an administrative judge examination to 
qualify for the position.143 !e Appleseed Network reported in 
2009 that 56 percent of immigration judges had a prior job defined 
as adversarial to immigrants, including “INS/DHS Trial Attor-
neys, Office of Immigration Litigation attorneys, special Assistant 
United States Attorneys, border patrol lawyers, and other similar 
positions,” and another 24 percent of immigration judges had other 
prior government jobs.144 
Additionally, a unique feature of immigration court presents 
a stronger reason against judicial deference in the interpretation 
of agency decisions. !e “supervision of an adjudicative body by a 
prosecuting official runs counter to the APA philosophy that gov-
erns other administrative proceedings.”145 Yet a scenario in which 
both the immigration judges and ICE operate under the author-
ity of the DOJ has been allowed in immigration periods.  In fact, 
“immigration judges are appointed by the Attorney General and 
act under his control and supervision.”146 Despite the fairness, the 
APA’s philosophy reflects an understanding of the potential costs 
of allowing supervision of an adjudicating body by prosecuting of-
ficials. Given the potential for abuse in such a situation, judicial 
deference seems less desirable than in other areas of administrative 
law. Moreover, the sharp criticism of the immigration courts from 
the judiciary in recent years has undermined the plausibility of the 
argument that immigration courts have expertise that merits defer-
ence.  
Given these strains on arguments for deference to agency 
decisions, arguments that are consistent across different areas of 
administrative law, any argument for special deference in constitu-
tional immigration law seems even less plausible. 
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ARGUMENTS AGAINST JUDICIAL DEFERENCE IN 
IMMIGRATION CASES
!e consequences of employing such a different approach to 
the interpretation of constitutional requirements into one area of 
law raises challenging moral questions. As Kanstroom points out, 
an overwhelmingly deferential approach to judicial review of en-
forcement legislation targeting certain racial or ethnic groups illus-
trates the reasons why judicial review is revered as central to the 
preservation of American constitutional democracy.147
!ough there are many different theories about the proper 
scope of judicial review and the proper interpretive approach the 
Court should adopt, one philosophical tradition holds that the 
Court should have a role in ensuring the protection of minority 
rights and voice in the political process. !is view is reflected in 
the interpretive approach based on Justice Stone’s famous footnote 
four in United States v. Carolene Products Co., in which he asked, 
“whether prejudice against discrete and insular minorities may be 
a special condition, which tends generally to curtail the operation 
of those political processes ordinarily to be relied upon to protect 
minorities, and which may call for a correspondingly more search-
ing judicial inquiry.”148 From such a perspective, noncitizens in im-
migration proceedings would, if anything, be strong candidates for 
more, rather than less, searching judicial inquiry, since the lack of 
the right to vote limits noncitizens’ capacity to correct against dis-
crimination through political processes.
Furthermore, changes in immigration law and policy—par-
ticularly the increased use of immigration detention—strengthen 
the argument that noncitizens in immigration proceedings may be 
considered a discrete and insular minority. As noncitizens in immi-
gration proceedings are increasingly removed from normal societal 
interactions through detention, they arguably become more vulner-
able to discrimination and less likely to be able to effectively assert 
their rights. Additionally, Stephen Legomsky suggests that, “aliens’ 
relative lack of familiarity with the legal system, the language, and 
the customs” may undermine their ability to participate in the po-
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litical process,149 creating precisely the type of circumstance that 
drives concern for protecting the interests of discrete and insular 
minorities. 
John Hart Ely has advanced the clearest theoretical justifica-
tions for what he calls a “representation-reinforcing, participation-
oriented approach to judicial review,”150 similar to the approach 
outlined in footnote four.  Ely argues that the Constitution itself 
supports this approach and that the approach is “entirely support-
ive of, the underlying premises of the American system of represen-
tative democracy.”151 !is approach also “involves tasks that courts, 
as experts on process and (more important) as political outsiders, 
can sensibly claim to be better qualified and situated to perform 
than political officials.”152 
 While the argument from the text of the Constitution has no 
special applicability to immigration cases, the argument about the 
court’s capacity emphasizes why judicial deference is less desirable 
in immigration cases. As Ely points out, “lawyers are experts in pro-
cess writ small, the processes by which facts are found and contend-
ing parties are allowed to present their claim.”153 Since procedural 
rights are central in constitutional immigration law, the Court’s ex-
pertise in process may justify judicial review in immigration cases. 
One response may be that Ely’s argument was constructed 
with reference to citizens, and since noncitizens do not have com-
parable rights to political participation, Ely’s concern with poten-
tial restrictions on participatory rights would not apply. However, 
affording noncitizens due process rights at all reflects recognition 
that these rights should not be contingent upon political participa-
tion. 
PUNISHMENT 
!e Court has historically invoked the claim that “deporta-
tion is not punishment” to resolve tensions created by its uniquely 
deferential approach to constitutional interpretation of immigra-
tion cases. Since deportation is not punishment, so the argument 
goes, noncitizens are not owed the same procedural protections 
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afforded those in the criminal justice system. "at this claim has 
become less plausible illustrates the dangers associated with em-
ploying a uniquely deferential interpretive approach in one area of 
constitutional law. 
Firstly, deportation and immigration detention are expe-
rienced as punishment. As Judge Sarokin emphasized in a 1996 
opinion:
"e legal fiction that deportation following a criminal convic-
tion is not punishment is difficult to reconcile with reality, espe-
cially in the context of this case. Mr. Scheidemann entered this 
country at age twelve; he has lived here for thirty-six years; he 
has been married to an American citizen for twenty-four years; 
he has raised three children all of whom are American citizens; 
his elderly parents are naturalized American citizens; two of his 
four siblings are naturalized American citizens, and all four of 
them reside permanently in the United States; he has no ties to 
Colombia, the country to which he is to be deported; and he has 
fully served the sentence imposed on him. If deportation under 
such circumstances is not punishment, it is difficult to envision 
what is.154 
Deported or detained noncitizens suffer significant harm due to 
the often degrading conditions in immigration detention facili-
ties and the sometimes permanent, forced separation from friends, 
family, and community. Also, lawful permanent residents often ac-
cept harsher consequences in sentencing in criminal proceedings 
such as longer terms of incarceration or extensions of parole to 
avoid triggering negative immigration consequences.155 Immigra-
tion consequences are often even directly considered by the court 
during sentencing in criminal proceedings, according to a Boston 
attorney specializing in immigration law and criminal defense.156
While the severity of the consequences in immigration pro-
ceedings leads noncitizens to experience and understand detention 
and deportation as punishment, severity of harm alone does not 
constitute punishment.157 As Huge Bedau and Erin Kelly have ex-
plained, punishment “in its very conception is now acknowledged 
to be an inherently retributive practice.”158 "eories of punishment 
have ranged, as Bedau and Kelly discuss, from “deterrent effects of 
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punishment … [to] social defense through incarceration [to] re-
tributivism.”159 Increasingly, American immigration law and policy 
have assumed these definitional features of punishment. In certain 
immigration cases, such as those in which a legal permanent resi-
dent is placed in removal proceedings following a conviction for an 
aggravated felony, the punitive intent seems clear. 
Kanstroom provides a useful framework for understanding 
the different intent in different types of immigration cases by dis-
tinguishing between extended border control policy and post -entry 
social control enforcement.160 While the extended border control 
model “implements basic features of sovereign power: the control 
of territory by the state and the legal distinction between citizens 
and noncitizens,”161 post-entry social control imposes immigration 
penalties based on actions of noncitizens once admitted. As the 
legislation starting in the 1980s significantly accelerated the over-
lap between immigration and criminal law, the immigration system 
shifted away from the border control, regulatory model and toward 
the “post-entry social control” model, a model that strongly implies 
a punitive rather than remedial purpose for removal. 
Certain immigration proceedings have also increasingly tak-
en on a distinguishing philosophical purpose of punishment and, 
particularly, of incarceration: incapacitation. Incapacitation is pres-
ent as an element of the current immigration adjudication system 
in two ways.  Most literally, preventive detention, a “stapl[e] of the 
criminal justice system,” is increasingly employed as a mechanism 
of incapacitation in immigration proceedings over the past twenty 
years.162 At a more theoretical level, as Legomsky notes, criminal 
sentencing should reflect the desired “degree of retribution, deter-
rence, and incapacitation.”163 If one argues that immigration conse-
quences are neither retributive nor deterrent, the best characteriza-
tion of deportation for post entry crimes is as the country’s “ridding 
[itself ] of those noncitizens whose presence is undesirable.”164 
Employing deportation to effectuate this judgment about desir-
ability could be considered a form of incapacitation that operates 
by removing the offender from society.165  Finally, the Department 
of Homeland Security describes noncitizens with criminal records 
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as “criminal aliens” who are among the “worst of the worst.”166 !e 
expressive component of this labeling illustrates the retributive in-
tent of immigration policy.  
In explaining the conclusion that deportation is not punish-
ment, courts have largely employed circular reasoning, pointing to 
the designation of immigration law as civil rather than criminal to 
justify continuing to categorize deportation or immigration deten-
tion as not-punishment.167 !ough the argument to consider im-
migration proceedings as punishment is certainly stronger in some 
cases than others, in many cases the Court’s argument that depor-
tation is not punishment has become untenable. 
DEFERENCE AND CONSTITUTIONALISM
Although the Court gave some indication in Padilla v. Ken-
tucky (2010) of willingness to reconsider the designation of depor-
tation as non-punishment, the Court’s treatment of immigration 
cases still largely reflects the deference embedded in the plenary 
power doctrine. Particularly given the changes in immigration law 
and policy in recent years, the claim that deportation is not a pun-
ishment has become a less convincing explanation for the diver-
gence between the Court’s assumptions about immigration and the 
reality experienced by hundreds of thousands of noncitizens in im-
migration proceedings each year.  
!e consequence of this divergence is a doctrine that nomi-
nally protects noncitizens’ constitutional claims to due process 
protections but functionally fails to do so, effectively placing non-
citizens who are in immigration proceedings outside the protection 
of the Constitution.  Failure to meaningfully protect constitutional 
guarantees undermines the United States’ claims of commitment to 
due process and constitutional democracy. Even though the Court’s 
own explanations for definitions of due process in other areas of 
law apply with increasing force to immigration laws, the Court has 
continued to show striking deference in interpreting the scope of 
noncitizens’ due process rights in immigration proceedings.  For 
instance, the Court’s explanation for finding a due process right to 
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government appointed counsel in criminal proceedings in Gideon v. 
Wainwright (1963) also applies to immigration proceedings. Justice 
Black wrote:
In our adversary system of criminal justice, any person haled 
into court, who is too poor to hire a lawyer, cannot be assured a 
fair trial unless counsel is provided for him … !at government 
hires lawyers to prosecute and defendants who have the money 
hire lawyers to defend are the strongest indications of the wide-
spread belief that lawyers in criminal courts are necessities, not 
luxuries.168 
In immigration court, the government hires lawyers to prosecute 
DHS's case in an adversarial system, and defendants with the re-
sources consistently hire an attorney. Statistical analyses have dem-
onstrated different outcomes for those afforded legal counsel in 
immigration proceedings, further suggesting that the concern with 
fairness that motivated the Court to hold that due process required 
provision of an attorney in criminal proceedings is also relevant in 
immigration proceedings. 
Furthermore, as Legomsky points out, “the reason for build-
ing such stringent procedural safeguards into the criminal justice 
system is that the consequences of criminal convictions are poten-
tially so severe.”169  Yet, the consequences in immigration court in-
creasingly mirror those in criminal court. Immigration detention 
has become more common, and most noncitizens in criminal pro-
ceedings would accept harsher penalties in criminal court in order 
to avoid immigration consequences.
!e criminal justice and immigration adjudication systems 
in the United States serve different purposes and may legitimately 
provide for different procedural protections.  However, as the rea-
sons for requiring a certain procedure in one situation increasingly 
apply to the other, different circumstances seem to be a less com-
pelling explanation for affording such different rights protections. 
!is tension at the intersection of constitutional and immi-
gration law is ethically problematic because of its implications for 
constitutionalism as well as the historical and philosophical signifi-
cance of procedural due process protections.
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PROCEDURAL DUE PROCESS 
!e concept of procedural due process is inextricably linked 
to rule of law and constitutionalism. Anna Law suggests that, “the 
idea [of due process] also represents a value that derives directly 
from the roles and mission of legal institutions.”170  Putting aside 
questions of how due process would be interpreted, the idea of 
procedural protections against inappropriate exercise of govern-
ment power resonates deeply in American society and ethics, thus 
reflecting a societal commitment to an ideal of fairness. !ough 
procedural requirements do not guarantee against government tak-
ing a certain action, they reflect the understanding that the exercise 
of power is constrained by law that applies to all persons.  For this 
reason, Larry May argues, “the idea of due process of law is recog-
nized as the cornerstone of domestic legal systems … Due process 
rights thus bring deep-seated considerations against the arbitrary 
exercise of power into some kind of institutional structure, espe-
cially one that connects these moral ideas to legal practicalities.”171 
In American law, procedural due process restricts the govern-
ment’s ability to deprive persons of “life, liberty, or property” with-
out first adhering to certain procedures designed to ensure that de-
privation is not undue. !ough the procedural protections due in a 
particular case may translate into different substantive guarantees 
in different cases, procedural protections reflect an underlying faith 
in law as a mechanism for protecting against fundamentally unfair 
government action. !e Court’s interpretation of due process is in-
creasingly explained by the Court’s judgments about the identity 
of the claimant—a noncitizen in immigration proceedings, for ex-
ample—rather than by situational concerns associated with those 
proceedings. Determining that lesser procedural protections would 
be owed based on the claimant’s identity rather than on situational 
concerns that may affect the likelihood of ‘undue’ government de-
privation of life, liberty, or property contradicts the concern with 
basic fairness so intertwined with procedural due process.
Failure to meaningfully protect due process rights afforded 
noncitizens suggests a lesser concern with inappropriate govern-
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ment violations of those persons’ claims to life, liberty, or property, 
and even, arguably, a willingness to place these persons outside the 
law. !e unacceptability of functionally stripping a person of rights 
deemed so important that they should be conferred by personhood 
is illustrated by Alexander Bickel’s observation that, “It has always 
been easier, it always will be easier, to think of someone as a non-
citizen than to decide that he is a non-person, which is the point of 
the Dred Scott case.”172 Denying legal protections associated with 
personhood violates deeply held notions about respect for human 
dignity and what democratic governments owe persons by virtue of 
their personhood.
DEPORTATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL DEMOCRACY
!e rhetoric of moral desert in the discourse on immigration 
policy historically recognized legal status as marking the cleavage 
between the deserving and the undeserving. !roughout the 1980s 
and 1990s, however, this paradigm shifted, and documented resi-
dents with any criminal history were re-categorized as undeserv-
ing.  As law increasingly targeted these criminal aliens, a divergence 
occurred between the procedural protections afforded in immigra-
tion proceedings and the similarity of these cases to criminal cases 
in the salient respects identified as meriting stronger procedural 
protection. 
At the same time, the Supreme Court identified immigration 
law as different from other types of law. !e plenary power doc-
trine was developed in the late nineteenth century, relying heavily 
on extra-constitutional arguments about the nature of immigra-
tion to justify special treatment of immigration law. Under the 
plenary power doctrine, early arguments for restricting judicial 
review were translated into a largely unexplained requirement for 
judicial deference. In an attempt to reconcile the tension between 
the claim that the Constitution protected noncitizens’ due process 
rights and the ruling that the Court did not have the authority to 
interpret the scope of those constitutional requirements, the Court 
announced that deportation was not punishment.  !e Court de-
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flected arguments of inappropriate deference to Congress and the 
executive by insisting that constitutional requirements in immigra-
tion proceedings were not being violated, no matter how narrowly 
other branches of government protected those requirements. After 
all, deportation was not punishment and did not merit comparable 
procedural protections to those afforded in criminal court. As the 
landscape of immigration law and policy has changed, however, 
this explanation has become increasingly implausible. "e grow-
ing overlap between criminal and immigration law underscores 
the discrepancy between the Court’s treatment of due process re-
quirements in criminal and immigration cases. In this way, changes 
in immigration law and policy exacerbate internal tensions in the 
Court’s interpretation of constitutional requirements in immigra-
tion cases. 
"ese developments in immigration law and policy have prag-
matic, legal, and moral concerns that are worthy of consideration. 
On a practical level, the immigration enforcement and adjudication 
system currently operates at massive cost to the government. Pre-
cisely what the goals of those two systems are and whether current 
policies allow for those systems to fulfill their intended purposes 
are debatable. In many instances, policies do not effectively fulfill 
their stated purposes. For example, if concern for public safety 
is the driving force behind the Obama administration’s focus on 
apprehending and deporting criminal aliens, the administration 
should evaluate whether the massive costs associated with the en-
forcement of immigration laws is the most effective allocation of 
those funds. "at the criminal justice system had already purport-
edly imposed a just penalty undercuts the idea that all noncitizens 
processed through the criminal justice system pose a threat to pub-
lic safety. 
Not only do the immigration enforcement and adjudication 
systems currently operate at massive cost to the government, they 
also cause massive suffering. Given the severity of the trauma of 
deportation or immigration detention, reasonable interpretations 
of the constitutional due process requirements suggest that fairly 
robust procedural protections must accompany any imposition of 
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those penalties. If certain procedural protections, such as the right 
to legal counsel, have been deemed necessary to ensure fundamen-
tal fairness in criminal court, failure to provide those protections 
in immigration proceedings—where comparable interests are at 
stake—suggests a lack of concern with the fundamental fairness of 
those proceedings. 
A wide range of commentators on the ethics of immigration 
regulation accept the proposition that the United States has moral 
obligations to all persons, and particularly strong moral obligations 
to long-term permanent residents the state has accepted. !at ob-
ligation, at a minimum, requires that the United States not impose 
harsh penalties without minimal procedural safeguards to protect 
against fundamentally unfair imposition of those penalties. Pro-
tection of noncitizens in immigration proceedings under the Due 
Process clause need not yield the same procedural protections in 
all cases or the same procedural protections as those afforded in 
criminal courts. However, in at least certain cases the United States 
has a moral obligation to afford noncitizens stronger procedural 
protections in immigration proceedings in order to protect the 
fundamental fairness of those proceedings. Different beliefs about 
American constitutional democracy may yield different judgments 
about the acceptability of the Court’s deference. However, even 
those who believe the Court ought to show greater deference in all 
cases should accept the claim that the Court ought to give stronger 
reasons for interpreting one area of law so differently from others, 
if consistency and coherence are to be valued as conferring institu-
tional legitimacy.
!is notion of limits on the exercise of coercive government 
power is central to the American constitutional democracy, and 
while reasonable people may disagree about the proper scope of 
those limits, most accept that procedural protections against gov-
ernment impositions on fundamental interests form a baseline of 
what is constitutionally required. From this perspective, the Su-
preme Court, as the branch of government historically charged 
with interpreting the scope of constitutional limits on the exercise 
of government power, has a strong duty to at a minimum protect 
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the procedural rights of the “12.4 million permanent residents and 
1.7 million legal temporary migrants”173 in the United States as of 
March 2010. 
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